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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
absolutely nothing in the record to indicate that counsel had been afforded
the mandatory ten days to prepare for trial.333
III. PRETRIAL
by
Tom Mills, Jr. *
Speedy Trial, Continuance, Venue, Order of Trial Severance, Double
Jeopardy, Recusal of Judge, Vindictive Indictment, Indictment, Dis-
covery, Search and Seizure, Suppression of Evidence
A. Speedy Trial
In Turner v. State334 a delay of two years and three months occurred
between the defendant's first request for a speedy trial and the trial. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals applied the balancing test set out in Barker
v. Wingo335 and found that the length of the delay, the reason for the delay,
and the fact that the defendant had asserted his rights and was actually
prejudiced by the delay demonstrated that he was deprived of his right to a
speedy trial. Dissenting from the overruling of the State's motion for rehear-
ing, Judge Douglas asserted that the defendant had not been "harmed"
sufficiently to justify the order of dismissal. Since the defendant was a
federal prisoner during the entire time he sought a speedy trial on the State
charge, the examination of the issue of "harm" by both the majority and the
dissent will be of future significance.
In Newcomb v. State336 a hearing on a motion to revoke the defendant's
probation was delayed for seven months, during which time he was jailed.
The court ruled that Ex parte Trillo,337 guaranteeing a prompt hearing on the
motion to revoke if requested by the defendant, did not apply because no
such request was made. Further, the court declined to address the issue of
whether his right to a speedy trial under the Barker v. Wingo338 doctrine had
been violated. The defendant had asserted on appeal that the length of delay
in his case constituted a denial of a speedy hearing as a matter of law rather
than as applied to the particular facts of his case. The court refused to
address the issue sua sponte and thereby declined to establish precedent for
considering unassigned Barker v. Wingo339 error.
333. Id. The opinion differentiated this case from McBride v. State, 519 S.W.2d 433 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1974), in which the record showed that counsel had filed a motion for discovery ten
days prior to trial.
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law,
Dallas, Texas.
334. 545 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Crim..App. 1976).
335. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
336. 547 S.W.2d 37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
337. 540 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
338. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
339. Id.
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Petitioner in Ex parte Mead3" claimed that he had not had a prompt
hearing in mental illness court to determine his competency to face criminal
charges. He sought dismissal of the criminal action because his constitution-
al right to a speedy hearing had been violated. Finding that petitioner had
such a constitutional right, the court nevertheless declined to order im-
mediate release, and instead ordered a trial within thirty days to rectify the
"tragic picture painted by this appeal.- 341
In United States v. Rice342 the defendant complained that the three and
one half year delay between the close of the alleged criminal activities and
the return of the indictment constituted a denial of a speedy trial by indict-
ment delay. The sixth "amendment right to a speedy trial, however, arises
only when a defendant becomes an accused, either through arrest, indict-
ment, or information.3 43 The guarantee against the bringing of overly stale
criminal charges must be enforced through the due process clause and the
applicable statute of limitations. Under the due process test a defendant
must demonstrate either substantial actual prejudice resulting from the
delay or that the delay was an intentional measure designed to gain a tactical
advantage for the prosecution.344 Since neither showing would have been
met in this case even if the defendant's assertions had been proved, the
denial of an evidentiary hearing on the matter by the trial court was held not
erroneous.
Although not effective until July 1, 1978, important legislation affecting
the speedy trial in criminal cases was passed by the Texas Legislature during
this survey period. The Code of Criminal Procedure was amended to add
article 32A which provides specific time limitations within which cases must
be tried.345 While the Federal Speedy Trial Act 3 6 is not identical to the new
Texas act, recent litigation concerning the applicability and constitutionality
of the federal act347 should provide a fertile source of challenges to the state
act.
B. Continuance
Motions for continuance were filed before trial in both Salinas v. State
348
and Leach v. State.349 In Salinas the evidence adduced at a pretrial hearing
did not indicate that the defendant could secure a missing witness even if
given the requested delay; it did, however, indicate that the trial would be
delayed indefinitely if the continuance were granted. In affirming the denial
340. 550 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
341. Id. at 682.
342. 550 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1977).
343. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971); United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 981 (1974).
344. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
345. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02 (Vernon Supp. 1978). Cases must be tried
within limits varying from 30-120 days, depending on the seriousness of the offense.
346. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (Supp. IV 1974).
347. See United States v. Howard, [1977] 22 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2182 (D. Md. 1977),
holding that the Federal Speedy Trial Act unconstitutionally encroaches on the power of the
judiciary.
348. 542 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
349. 548 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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of the motion for continuance, the court additionally noted that the defend-
ant's motion did not allege as statutorily required 350 that the testimony could
not be procured from any other known source. In Leach the defendant
sought a continuance so that he could have the benefit of his chemist's
analysis to show that the substance he was accused of delivering was not
LSD. He failed, however, in his motion for new trial to produce evidence to
show that the chemist's testimony would have been favorable to his
defense.
Munoz v. State35 1 was reversed because the record failed to show that the
defendant's appointed attorney had been afforded the mandatory ten days
for preparation prior to trial. 32 A formal notice had been sent to counsel
more than ten days before the trial on a different case involving the same
defendant. The record, however, contained no affirmative showing that
counsel was afforded the mandatory time in the actual case at issue.
Motions for continuance were made during the trial in Walker v. State353
and Ewing v. State.354 In neither case did the trial court err in denying the
motion since neither defendant presented for the record the purported
additional testimony or evidence that would have been offered in support of
his defense.
C. Venue
Reversal for an abuse of discretion in denying a change of venue remains
difficult to obtain. Absent a showing of "the existence of such prejudice in
the community that the likelihood of obtaining a fair. and impartial jury is
doubtful," 35 5 a trial judge is within the limits of his discretion in denying the
change of venue.
The decision in Bell v. State,356 reversing a ninety-nine year sentence for
rape, resulted in the passage of new legislation affecting venue. Bell was
found guilty of abducting a girl in Dallas County and driving her to a home in
Rockwall County, where he forcibly raped her; he then drove her back to
Dallas County and was arrested after a high-speed chase. It was uncon-
troverted that the actual rape was committed in Rockwall County, but the
trial itself took place in Dallas. The special venue statute provided that a
prosecution for rape could proceed in the county in which the rape occurred;
in any county of the judicial district in which the rape occurred; or, if the
rape occurred in a judicial district comprising only one county, in any
adjoining county.3 57 Since Rockwell County is part of a multicounty judicial
district, the court held that venue was proper only in that district, and not
proper in adjoining Dallas County. In reversing the conviction, the court
350. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 29.07 (Vernon 1966).
351. 542 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
352. TEX. CODE CRIM. Paoc. ANN. art. 26.04 (Vernon 1965).
353. 543 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (continuance requested to secure missing
witness).
354. 549 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (continuance sought to obtain corroboration of
defendant's mistreatment in jail).
355. James v. State, 546 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
356. 546 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
357. 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 722, art. 13.22, at 360.
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overruled Phillips v. State358 to the extent that it had misinterpreted article
13.22 by finding venue in a single county judicial district when the offense
was committed in an adjoining county. Judge Odom concurred but ex-
pressed puzzlement over the legislature's restrictions on rape prosecutions.
Apparently the message got to the legislature, because the venue statute was
amended during this survey period to allow a prosecution for rape in the
county in which it is committed, in the county in which the victim is
abducted, or in any county through or into which the victim is transported in
the course of the abduction and rape.3 59 This broadens the allowable venue
even beyond that which would have been necessary to prosecute the defend-
ant in Bell.
D. Order of Trial
When a severance is granted, defendants may agree upon the order in
which they are to be tried; if they fail to agree, the court directs the order of
trial.360 In Lafoon v. State36' one defendant complained that the trial court
erred in refusing to grant his request for order of trial. The court held that
the statutory requirements were not met by the defendant, however, since
the only request made by the four co-indictees was that one specific person
be tried first. As there was no agreed order of trials for all persons, there
was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the motion as to one
defendant.
E. Severance
The defendant in' Overton v. State362 was tried before a jury upon a single
indictment containing two counts of aggravated robbery. He was acquitted
on one count but found guilty of the other. He objected to the joinder of
offenses in a single indictment by motions to quash and to require the State
to elect on which count he was to be tried. In reversing the conviction, the
court found that the motions clearly amounted to a request for severance
under section 3.04 of the Penal Code, 363 which grants an accused the right to
sever offenses arising out of the same criminal episode which have been
joined under article 21.24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 364
The Fifth Circuit affirmed a denial of severance in United States v.
Bolts.365 Bolts contended that the mass of evidence implicating his co-
defendant prejudiced his own right to a fair trial. Relying on the general rule
that persons jointly indicted should be tried together, 366 the court held that
an adequate cautionary instruction to the jury concerning the possibility of
prejudice was sufficient to protect his right to a fair trial. 367
358. 459 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
359. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 13.15 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
360. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 36.10 (Vernon 1966).
361. 543 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
362. 552 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
363. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 3.04 (Vernon 1974).
364. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 21.24 (Vernon 1966).
365. 558 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1977).
366. See United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976).
367. 558 F.2d at 323.
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F. Double Jeopardy
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court during this survey
period broke new ground in the area of double jeopardy. The decisions on
double jeopardy matters dealt with two issues: (1) multiplicity of prosecu-
tions and (2) retrial and government appeal of issues arising out of aborted
criminal proceedings.
In Brown v. Ohio318 the Court reaffirmed Blockburger v. United States369
which required an examination of the two crimes to see if they are actually
the same statutory offense for double jeopardy purposes. The Court indi-
cated that, as a general proposition, a defendant may not be prosecuted for
both a lesser offense and the greater offense that includes it. Thus, a
prosecution for auto theft following a conviction for joy riding was barred.
Further, the Court held that the State could not seek convictions for both
crimes by focusing the charges on different periods during the nine day
unauthorized taking of the automobile.
Although the Court purported to do nothing more than clarify the trilogy
of double jeopardy decisions announced in the previous term concerning the
right of the government to appeal from unfavorable trial court rulings,37
some new criteria were discussed. In United States v. Martin-Linen Supply
Co. 371 the Court examined a judgment of acquittal entered by the trial court
in response to a hung jury. Refusing to limit itself to the form of the
judgment, the Court analyzed the substance of the district court's action.
Since the record clearly established that the district court had determined
that the evidence presented was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction,
the Court held that the judgment was equivalent to a not guilty verdict for
double jeopardy purposes.
In Lee v. United States372 the district court had granted a defense motion
to dismiss the information as defective after the government had already
presented its evidence. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, held that the
allowance of a retrial was proper because the dismissal was functionally
indistinguishable from a mistrial declaration that contemplates a retrial. Mr.
Justice Marshall, dissenting, stated that the Court had passed up an opportu-
nity to prohibit rather than to condone fundamental errors in criminal
procedure.
The court of criminal appeals in Reynolds v. State373 relied on Supreme
Court decisions 374 to affirm a conviction for delivery of a controlled sub-
stance despite a prior federal conviction for the identical offense. Although
the defendant committed only one act, by violating statutes of two separate
sovereigns he committed two separate offenses; thus he could be prosecuted
and punished for both.
368. 97 S. Ct. 222, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977).
369. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
370. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975); United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358
(1975); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
371. 97 S. Ct. 1349, 51 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1977).
372. 97 S. Ct. 2141, 53 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1977).
373. 548 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
374. Wailer v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1%9);
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
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G. Recusal of Judge
When the defendant in Vera v. State375 waived a jury and pled guilty to
delivery and possession of heroin, the trial judge stated that he was not
inclined to give probation in a sale of heroin case. On appeal the defendant
contended that he was denied a fair trial on the issue of punishment because
the trial court was prejudiced against the range of punishment provided by
statute. The defendant did not ask the court to apply statutory 76 or constitu-
tional grounds3 77 for disqualification of a judge. Instead, he sought applica-
tion of article 35.16(c)(2), relating to juror disqualification. 37 8 That statute
provides that a juror is disqualified if he has a bias or prejudice against any
of the law applicable to the case. Bias or prejudice not based upon interest,
however, is not a legal disqualification for a judge379 and the court declined
to apply article 35.16(c)(2) to trial judges.
H. Vindictive Indictment
While the United States Supreme Court recognized the legitimacy of plea
bargaining in Santobello v. New York, 380 only when it decided Bordenkircher
v. Hayes38' did it face the issue of limits on prosecutorial conduct in the plea
bargaining process. The defendant in Hayes was told that if he refused to
plead guilty to an offense carrying two to ten years imprisonment, he would
instead be charged under the habitual criminal act and, if convicted, would
face a mandatory life sentence. He chose not to plead guilty and insisted on
a jury trial. The prosecutor obtained an indictment under the habitual
criminal statute and the defendant was convicted. The Court held that
allowing the prosecutor to carry out his threat did not violate the defendant's
right to due process. In particular, the Court stressed the fact that the
defendant had had prior warning of what the prosecutor intended to do and
re-emphasized the need for effective plea bargaining in criminal prosecu-
tions.
The Fifth Circuit addressed the subject of vindictive prosecution in Hard-
wick v. Doolittle.382 The court allowed a prosecutor some room to explain
and justify his actions in order to rebut a presumption of vindictive prosecu-
tion. Thus, he may show that his reasons for reindictment were other than to
punish a defendant for exercising his legal rights. On the other hand, in
United States v. DeMarco38 3 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the appearance of
vindictiveness on the part of the prosecutor and apprehension of vindictive-
ness on the part of the defendant bring a case squarely within the doctrine
375. 547 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
376. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 30.01 (Vernon 1966).
377. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11.
378. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 35.16(c)(2) (Vernon 1966).
379. Aldridge v. State, 342 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961) (bias of trial judge, standing
alone, does not constitute error; accused can complain of erroneous ruling made by trial court
as resulting from prejudice, but it would be error in ruling rather than prejudice that would give
him right to complain). See also Bolding v. State, 493 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
380. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
381. 46 U.S.L.W. 4089 (Jan. 18, 1978).
382. No. 76-1065 (5th Cir. Aug. 29, 1977).
383. 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1977). The prosecutor made no attempt to rebut the appearance
of vindictiveness.
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prohibiting vindictive indictment expressed in North Carolina v. Pearce384
and Blacklee v. Perry.385
I. Indictment
For many years the court of criminal appeals has consistently reversed
more cases for improper indictments than any other single cause. Thus, it is
wise to allege that an indictment is fundamentally defective as a ground of
error, even if no motion to quash was made in the trial court.
The form of an indictment may make it fundamentally defective. For
example, it must show on its face that the offense charged is not barred by
limitations. 386 When there is a special statute prohibiting conduct, the allega-
tion must be charged under it and not under the general statute. 38 7 When an
unnecessary fact is alleged to describe an element which is legally essential
to charge a crime, it must be proved as alleged, even though needlessly
stated. 31 When an otherwise innocent act may become criminal by manner
and means, it is necessary to allege facts showing the manner and means
which made the act a criminal offense.38 9 Nevertheless, the State need not
specifically describe personal property which is the subject of a theft, 39°
despite the wording of article 21.09 the Code of Criminal Procedure.3 91
Ambiguities in indictments caused by misspelled or misplaced words of art
will not result in reversal unless they can be shown to have misled the
defendant.392
In several cases3 93 interpreting the statute governing the passing of forged
checks, the court held that failure to file a motion to quash waived the defect
in indictments which omitted to allege that the defendant passed the checks
knowing that they were forged. Similarly, in Eanes v. State39 failure to file a
motion to quash constituted waiver of defects in an indictment which omit-
ted the manner and means used to commit an assault.
Citing a nineteenth century case which referred to "hairbreadth distinc-
tions" 395 in indictments, the court in Martin v. State396 rewrote the law
384. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
385. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
386. Ex parte Dickerson, 549 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
387. See, e.g., Ex parne Harrell, 542 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (defendant should
have been charged under more specific statute prohibiting possession of a forged instrument
with intent to utter it, rather than general offense of possession of a criminal instrument with
intent to use it in commission of offense).
388. Weaver v. State, 551 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (indictment alleging that
deadly weapon was .22 caliber "Ruger" held at fatal variance with proof that weapon used was
"Luger").
389. Posey v. State, 545 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
390. Welch v. State, 543 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
391. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.09 (Vernon Supp. 1978). This statute provides that
"if known, personal property alleged in an indictment shall be identified by name, kind,
number, and ownership."
392. Butler v. State, 551 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (use of the word."of" rather
than "by" in part of indictment did not make indictment defective for uncertainty).
393. Ivy v. State, 547 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Edmond v. State, 546 S.W.2d 289
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Jones v. State, 545 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
394. 546 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). The conviction, however, was reversed on
other grounds.
395. Goode v. State, 2 Tex. Crim. 520 (1877).
396. 541 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
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concerning idem sonans, which means names are the same that have the
same sound. The court concluded that the resolution of questions involving
the rule of idem sonans should be limited primarily to the triers of fact. They
will, therefore, refrain from disturbing on appeal a jury or trial court deter-
mination that names in question are idem sonans unless evidence shows that
the names are patently incapable of being sounded the same or that the
accused was misled to his prejudice. All decisions in conflict with that rule
were overruled.3 97 Consequently questions involving the rule of idem sonans
must be raised in the first instance at trial; if raised for the first time on
appeal, they will be treated as having been waived.
Many indictments were found to be defective for errors of omission.
Failure of an attempted arson indictment to allege that a defendant acted
"wilfully," as specified by statute,3 resulted in reversal in Huggins v.
State." In theft and criminal mischief cases failure to allege that property
was destroyed or taken without the "effective consent of the owner"
resulted in numerous reversals.' Likewise, failure to allege a "culpable
mental state" resulted in reversals in Bocanegra v. State 40 and Tew v.
State. °1 2 Clearly, an indictment which does not allege an offense under the
law is utterly insufficient and any conviction based thereon will be con-
sidered void; this will allow reversals for "fundamental error."
Although normally indictments which track the pertinent portions of a
statute and allege culpability are sufficient, in certain cases additional infor-
mation must be set out to give the defendant sufficient notice of the precise
charge against him."°3 Thus, in Amaya v. State4°4 an information charging a
defendant with obtaining welfare benefits by means of wilfully false state-
ments was defective for failing to set out the specific "wilfully false state-
ments" allegedly made. Similarly, an indictment charging a parent with
injury to a child by failure to secure proper medical treatment was held
insufficient because it failed to allege the relationship which placed the
defendant under a statutory duty to secure such medical treatment. 405 Fur-
ther, an indictment for indecency with a child 4°6 must state that the sexual
contact was engaged in "with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire
of any person" because "[w]here a particular intent is a material fact in the
description of the offense, it must be stated in the indictment.' 407 An
indictment for driving a motor vehicle while the operator's license was
suspended must state the reason for the suspension. 408
397. Id. at 608.
398. The statute applicable at that time was TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. app. art. 1316 (Vernon
1974) (repealed 1973).
399. 544 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
400. Reynolds v. State, 547 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Davis v. State, 547 S.W.2d
43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Timms v. State, 542 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
401. 552 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
402. 551 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
403. See American Plant Food Corp. V. State, 508 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
404. 551 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
405. Ronk v. State, 544 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
406. Victory v. State, 547 S.W.2d I (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
407. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 21.05 (Vernon 1966).
408. Tave v. State, 546 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
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"Attempt" indictments are not fatally defective for omitting the magic
language, "conduct amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but
fails to effect the commission of the offense intended," °9 but they must
nevertheless state an offense. In Hobbs v. State410 the State intended to
charge attempted capital murder, but the indictment failed to recite that the
defendant hired or employed another person; because the indictment failed
to meet the statutory definition of the crime, the conviction was reversed.
An indictment which describes the conduct made the basis of the attempt,
however, does not have to allege the constitutent elements of the offense
attempted.:
J. Discovery
Although most of the significant opinions in the discovery area had to do
with "evidence favorable to the accused," some general discovery law was
clarified. One such clarification involved disclosure of witnesses to be used
by the State in any stage of the trial.412 In Young v. State413 the trial court
granted a pretrial motion seeking discovery of the names of the witnesses
expected to be used by the State at the punishment stage of the trial; the
State informed the court that it did not know what witnesses it would call on
punishment. Since the defendant never raised the issue again, nor did he
object when the State called witnesses at the punishment stage, the court of
criminal appeals denied reversal. Likewise, in Smith v, State414 the defend-
ant moved for discovery of technical reports concerning a rape committed
during a bank robbery. The prosecutor informed the court that he did not
have the information available when the request was made. As no further
request was made, failure to comply with the discovery motion was not
error. In Gollin v. State415 the prosecutor furnished defense counsel with a
typewritten copy of a confession, rather than a copy of the original. Since
the defendant showed no harm or prejudice from receipt of the copy instead
of the original, the court found no error. In contrast, a motion for discovery
requesting the name of an informer, who was shown to be a material
witness, resulted in error meriting reversal in Stein v. State416 when the State
failed to produce the witness.
Because state courts rely increasingly on presentence reports prepared by
probation officers in assessing punishment, United States v. Hodges417 may
in certain instances apply to state court proceedings. In that case the Fifth
Circuit held that, upon request, defendant or his counsel was entitled to
sufficient time to read the presentence report and to comment on any alleged
factual inaccuracy before sentence was imposed.
409. Hobbs v. State, 548 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
410. Id.
411. Williams v. State, 544 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
412. See Hoagland v. State, 494 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (Odom, J.,
concurring).
413. 547 S.W.2d 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
414. 547 S.W.2d 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
415. 554 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
416. 548 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
417. 547 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1977).
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Alleged Gaskin rule418 violations were considered in several significant
opinions. Toler v. State4"9 held that even if the defendant was entitled to
examine a police offense report error was waived since the reports were not
included in the appellate record or sealed and forwarded to the court for
inspection. According to Mendoza v. State,42 ° harm in denying reports or
statements is determined by considering whether an accused is thereby
denied effective cross-examination or possible impeachment of a witness.
Therefore, in determining "harmfulness" the appellate court must be able to
see a report or statement, and failure to make an effort to incorporate it in
the appellate record will result in waiver of any error.42 1 Furthermore, when
reports are included for appellate review, an error by the trial court in failing
to provide the reports to counsel during trial is harmless if the witnesses'
testimony is entirely consistent with his prior statements.422 On the other
hand, it was not error for the trial court in Granviel v. State423 to order that
the report of a psychiatrist appointed by the court on defense counsel's
request be turned over to the State. Since the psychiatrist had been appoint-
ed by the court, his report was available to either party; moreover,
communications between a physician and his patient are not privileged in
Texas 424
Contentions that the State suppressed "evidence favorable to the ac-
cused" were numerous. In Ex parte Prior4 25 the defendant contended that
the State suppressed from his counsel the fact that he was unconscious
during a robbery and rape offense. Since he knew of his condition at the
time of the offense, however, he was not allowed to attribute suppression of
evidence to the prosecution. 426 The defendant was unsuccessful in United
States v. Trevino 427 in discovering the presentence report of a complaining
witness who had pled guilty to the offense before testifying against the
defendant. Interpreting his motion for discovery as a Brady v. Maryland4 28
request, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless declined to extend Brady, holding
that material possessed by the court or its probation officer is not within
Brady reach. In Ransonette v. State,4 29 the defendant contended that the
trial court erred in denying his request to have the court make an in camera
inspection of the prosecutor's file to determine if it contained evidence
favorable to him. The motion in effect admitted that he knew of no material
418. Gaskin v. State, 177 Tex. Crim. 7, 353 S.W.2d 467 (1961) (defendant has right to inspect
prior statements of prosecution witnesses).
419. 546 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
420. 552 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
421. Id.
422. Ogle v. State, 548 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
423. 552 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2642, 53 L. Ed. 2d 250
(1977).
424. Bonewald v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 521, 251 S.W.2d 255 (1952); Dodd v. State, 83 Tex.
Crim. 160, 201 S.W. 1014 (1918).
425. 540 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
426. Cf. Means v. State, 429 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (failure to disclose
evidence which may have been helpful to defense not reversible error where not materially
affecting determination of guilt or innocence).
427. 556 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1977).
428. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
429. 550 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
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held by the prosecutor which was favorable to his defense. Such a request
was too broad to be effective under the holding of the Supreme Court in
United States v. Agurs430 that a general request for exculpatory matters is
equivalent to no request at all. The court in Ransonette held that under
Brady v. Maryland4 31 and Means v. State4 32 the elements which must be
shown in a successful motion for favorable evidence are: (1) suppression of
evidence by the prosecution after a request by the defense; (2) the evi-
dence's favorable character for the defense; and (3) the materiality of the
evidence. 433 Therefore, the request was properly denied.
In contrast, the deliberate actions taken by the State to suppress evidence
favorable to the accused, whether or not in response to a request by defense
counsel, result in constitutional error. For example, in Exparte Turner434 the
prosecution had knowledge that a narcotics officer effected the release of a
State's witness. This knowledge, the court held, should not have been
suppressed and in fact hidden from the defense "irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 435 The suppression of facts deprived
the defendant of due process.
K. Search and Seizure; Suppression of Evidence
Warrantless Arrest-Scope of Search. Officers may stop citizens in auto-
mobiles on less than probable cause under the same sorts of circumstances
enabling them to stop those on foot. 436 For example, cars may be stopped for
driver's license checks, but further investigation requires something more.
Detecting the odor of marijuana and seeing a passenger under the influence
of drugs justifed further investigation in Tardiff v. State.437 Since the pur-
pose of such a detention is strictly limited by statute, 431 however, it will not
justify an investigation exceeding the initial purpose in the absence of
articulable suspicious conduct. 39
In Robertson v. State"0 a thorough automobile search, pursuant to a
lawful traffic arrest, was held to be proper when the automobile had been
taken into police custody. Acknowledging that such an "inventory" search
has been approved by the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Opperman,44
the dissent distinguished Opperman on its facts; in Robertson the car was
merely under police "control" following an accident, rather than in police
430. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
431. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
432. 429 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
433. See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
434. 545 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
435. Id. at 475.
436. The constitutional validity of such an investigative stop depends on "specific and
articulable facts and circumstances" and the officer's reasonable inferences from those facts in
each individual case. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
437. 548 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
438. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687(b), § 13 (Vernon 1977).
439. Faulkner v. State, 549 S.W.2d I (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (overruling Black v. State, 491
S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Black had affirmed a conviction for possession of a pistol
seen only after looking for car registration papers to confirm an apparently valid driver's
license).
440. 541 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
441. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
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"custody" as occurs when a vehicle is impounded. The dissenting judge
described the case as providing a "new exception to the fourth amend-
ment.1""2 Nevertheless, absent "inventory search" testimony, automobile
searches continue to be limited to that area necessary to protect the officers
from bodily injury during the arrest process443 and to those things in plain
view.
The "plain view doctrine" was clarified by the court of criminal appeals
in McDougald v. State4 4 and DeLao v. State." 5 In McDougald the court
reversed because of the failure to suppress evidence of a pistol. Although
the pistol was admittedly in plain view after voluntary consent had been
given to view the inside of the vehicle, the facts did not authorize an
investigatory stop under any theory; thus, only the unlawful stop allowed
the officer to be in a position to see the gun in plain view. In DeLao the
defendant was convicted for possession of heroin found in a red balloon on a
window sill. At the time the balloon was seized, the defendant was away
from the residence in police custody and thus search was not justified as
incident to arrest. Moreover, the facts did not indicate that the contraband
was in plain view. 4
Border search law was expanded to include a search of international mail
when customs officials have reasonable cause to suspect that the envelope
contains contraband. 7 Ochs v. State"8 also extended the "open fields
doctrine" 449 from the west Texas plains to the east Texas piney woods.
Details from an informant, insufficient to establish probable cause but
adequate to allow corroboration from surveillance officers, brought the case
within the Draper450 doctrine. The surveillance and viewing of marijuana,
made on Appellant's property at a distance of fifty yards from his house,
was considered a permissible intrusion onto "open fields."
In Vargas v. State45 ' a "private search" by a hospital nurse did not
constitute a "search" to which the exclusionary rule applies. 452 When such a
search uncovered a pistol, security officers were then justified in continuing
the inventory of the defendant's personal effects which included a heroin-
filled balloon.
Search With Warrant. The seizure of a pharmacist's prescription records
pursuant to an "administrative warrant" resulted in reversal in Poindexter v.
442. 541 S.W.2d at 611.
443. Beck v. State, 547 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). Although the traffic arrest was
valid, the arresting officer stated that he searched the glove compartment because of his
concern for "self protection." The record failed to present facts which would have given the o-
ficer reasonable grounds to believe he was in danger or that the person they encountered was
armed or dangerous. No testimony was presented by the officers regarding an "inventory
search."
444. 547 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
445. 550 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
446. Nicholas v. State, 502 S.W.2d 169 (1973).
447. United States v. Ramsey, 97 S. Ct. 1972, 52 L. Ed. 2d 617 (1977).
448. 543 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
449. First articulated in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1925), the doctrine excepts
from the protection of the fourth amendment those items found in open fields.
450. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
451. 542 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
452. The nurse in Vargas was not searching for contraband.
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State.1 35 The law enforcement officers had forcibly entered the defendant's
pharmacy without his consent, pursuant to an administrative order obtained
"for the purpose of examining, inspecting, and copying all records." 45 4 The
court held that the statute authorizing administrative searches 455 did not
permit searches such as the one which had taken place. Nor did the adminis-
trative order qualify for treatment as a search warrant, since it was not
based upon a sworn affidavit setting forth facts showing probable cause.456
Finding that the minimum requirements for proving credibility were not
set forth in the affidavit, Avery v. State457 reversed the defendant's convic-
tion. The only facts before the magistrate were that "informants have both
given information on numerous occasions in the past in reference to viola-
tions of the gambling laws of this state. '458 Nothing showed whether that
information was true or false.
Expunication of Record. Effective August 29, 1977, a person who is "enti-
tled" to expunction of his criminal record may file a petition in district court
in the county in which he was arrested. 459 He is entitled if no indictment or
information has been presented pursuant to his arrest, if he has been re-
leased and a charge has been dismissed, and if he has not been convicted of
a felony in the preceding five years.' ° The effect of an order of expunction
is to disallow arrest records for any purpose; to allow petitioner to deny the
occurrence of the arrest and the existence of the expunction order; and to
allow him to limit his answers under oath about the arrest to the fact that the
matter in question has been expunged. 461
Mere Evidence Warrants. A significant broadening of the allowable scope
for search warrants results from the amendment to article 18.01 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure .62 Two subsections have been added to the Article
which allow the issuance of "mere evidence" warrants. While the statute
attempts to specifically limit the proper circumstances for such a warrant,
allowing search and seizure of "property or items, except the personal
writings of the accused, constituting evidence of an offense or constituting
evidence tending to show that a particular person committed an offense"463
significantly strengthens the ability of the prosecutor to look for such
"evidence."
453. 545 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
454. Id. at 800.
455. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. app. art. 725b, § 15, art. 726d, § 6 (Vernon 1974) (repealed 1974).
456. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.01 (Vernon 1977).
457. 545 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
458. Id. at 804.
459. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.02 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
460. Id. art. 55.01.
461. Id. art. 55.03.
462. Id. art. 18.01 (Vernon 1977).
463. d. art. 18.02(10).
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